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  My goal at the outset of this Capstone Project was to determine how electric storage 
resources (“ESRs”) can be compensated for the services they can provide and whether ESRs can 
actually stack the value they offer in practice.  To ascertain the answer to these questions, I 
conducted a review of relevant federal and state regulatory proceedings, decisions, and policies.  
What I discovered is that currently regulatory barriers prevent electric storage from monetizing 
all of the services that ESRs can provide, thereby preventing the technologies from delivering a 
full value stack.  Starting from the premise espoused by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission that the goal should be to realize the full capabilities of ESRs, I offer a path forward 
that would include the competitive procurement of ESRs through transmission planning and 
allowing the winning ESRs to also participate in energy markets in retain the resulting revenues.  
I reason that this path allows ESRs to realize their full capabilities and addresses the concerns 
raised by regulators that have so far prevented electric storage from monetizing its full value 
stack.  My research and this paper were aided by foundational knowledge I gained through the 
courses in this program, including on electric storage technologies, policies, and economics in 
the Emerging Energy Technologies and Applications course and on energy and electric grid 
policies in the courses on the Electric Grid: Technology and Policy and Introduction to Energy 
Law & Policy.  Finally, this paper is stylized as a law review article in keeping with the legal and 
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Electric storage resources (“ESRs”) have been broadly recognized to offer a variety of 
benefits, all of which must be utilized to maximize the utility of the particular device.  This 
concept is known as the value stack.  Unique among grid-related assets, electric storage can act 
as a generator (by producing energy), consumer (by consuming energy), or as a transmission or 
distribution provider (by deferring traditional wire transmission or distribution projects and 
supporting electric grid reliability).  However, monetization of the value provided for each of 
these roles takes a different form depending on the service rendered.  For example, consumers 
and generators can buy and sell electricity and related products into the markets administered by 
regional transmission organizations and independent system operators (“RTOs/ISOs”) under the 
oversight Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”).  Transmission and distribution 
providers are traditionally compensated through traditional cost-of-service rates or rates based on 
some other appropriate methodology.  “Multiple use” or “multi-use” refers to the ability of the 
ESR to monetize the value stack from both market services and transmission and distribution 
services and is the focus of this paper.1   
Unlocking the multi-use capabilities of electric storage is critical as studies have 
indicated that the transmission/distribution attributes represent roughly 30%-70% of the value of 
ESRs.2  As FERC has stated, “[e]nabling electric storage resources to provide multiple services 
                                                 
1  This paper will address front-of-the-meter, grid scale electricity storage, rather than customer-sited ESRs 
located behind-the-meter.  The value proposition presented by behind-the-meter energy storage is particular to 
the customer (e.g., decreasing billing determinants or providing backup power) and, as such, the analysis in this 
paper would have limited applicability to those systems. 
2  Ian Oxenham, Charging Onwards: Removing Barriers to Energy Storage in Restructured New England States, 
43 Vt. L. Rev. 575, 587 (2019). 
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(including both cost-based and market-based services) ensures that the full capabilities of these 
resources can be realized, thereby maximizing their efficiency and value for the system and to 
consumers.”3  However, FERC has also recognized the need for protecting customers when 
determining how ESRs may be compensated, such that ESRs should not be allowed to recover 
twice for providing the same service.  In other words, cost recovery for multi-use ESRs must be 
designed to prevent over- or double recovery. 
To strike this balance between protecting consumers and realizing the full capabilities of 
electric storage, including distribution and transmission services, this paper advocates a shift 
from the traditional transmission and distribution cost-of-service paradigm, whereby the utility is 
allowed to recover the entire cost of its transmission and distribution services in its regulated 
cost-based rate.  Instead, this paper argues that competitive procurement of transmission and 
distribution services, such as under FERC Order No. 1000, together with access to market 
revenues for ESR owners, offers an efficient and cost-effective path forward for multi-use ESRs.  
Allowing these ESRs to retain market revenues will allow bidders to propose transmission and 
distribution solutions at a reduced cost and will place the risk of market revenue under-recovery 
on the ESR owner, rather than customers, even if only partial cost recovery is achieved.  
Competitively established costs for the transmission and distribution services of ESRs will yield 
an appropriately priced solution and alleviate the need to adopt additional measures to prevent 
double recovery.   
This paper will review FERC and state utility commission decisions on multi-use ESRs, 
lay out the lessons learned from these proceedings, and suggest a path forward for monetizing 
                                                 
3  Utilization of Electric Storage Resources for Multiple Services When Receiving Cost-Based Rate Recovery, 
Policy Statement, 158 FERC ¶ 61,051 (2017). 
3 
 
the ESR value stack, focusing, in particular, on incorporating multi-use ESRs into the 
transmission planning process of the California Independent System Operator Corporation 
(“CAISO”).  The focus of this paper is determining the appropriate ratemaking methodology for 
multi-use ESRs to recover all or a portion of the costs of transmission and distribution services 
they provide, recognizing that they will also receive market revenues.  The ultimate conclusion 
reached by this paper synthesizes FERC policies, including transmission policies established by 
FERC Order No. 1000, with the state approaches. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE SERVICES PROVIDED BY 
ELECTRIC STORAGE  
 
a. The Electric Grid, Regulation, and Markets 
 
The traditional paradigm has been that, unlike other commodities, electricity must be 
consumed simultaneously with production.4  This is the fundamental limitation upon which the 
electric grid has been constructed.  At the three primary stages of electricity supply, represented 
in Figure 1 below, the electrons are first produced by generation, then carried over long distances 
by the high-voltage transmission network, and ultimately delivered to the consumer by the low-
voltage distribution network.5  Although seemingly simple at a high level, the details of 
maintaining a constant balance of supply and demand quickly complicate electric grid 
operations.  For example, the capacity of transmission and distribution lines limits the paths that 
electrons can follow and makes delivery into certain constrained areas more expensive than 
                                                 
4  See Kevin B. Jones, et al., The Electric Battery: Charging Forward to a Low-Carbon Future, 9 (2017) 
(explaining that the electric “grid still relies on constant generation that is responsive to demand and available at 
the precise moment of that demand.”). 
5  Jeremy Lin & Fernando H. Magnago, Electricity Markets: Theories and Applications, at 2 (1st ed. 2017) 
4 
 
others.6  Further, as supply must match demand, grid operators must manage a portfolio of 
generation with varying characteristics, including base load resources with limited ramping 
capability (e.g., coal and nuclear), variable renewable generators (e.g., wind and solar), and 
flexible ramping resources (e.g., natural gas combined-cycle and hydro).7 
FIGURE 18 
 
The regulation of this complex system of electric generation, transmission, and 
distribution is split between the FERC at the national level and various utility commissions at the 
individual state level.9  FERC has jurisdiction over the rates and terms and conditions for 
                                                 
6  Sydney P. Forrester, et al., Policy and market barriers to energy storage providing multiple service, The 
Electricity Journal 30, 51 (2017); David Schmitt & Glenn M. Sanford, Energy Storage: Can we Get it Right?, 
39 Energy L.J. 447. 473 (2018). 
7  Allen J. Wood & Bruce F. Wollenberg, Power Generation, Operation, and Control (2d ed. 1996); Alexandra B. 
Klass, Expanding the U.S. Electric Transmission and Distribution Grid to Meet Deep Decarbonization Goals, 
47 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10749, 10754 (2017); Alexandra B. Klass, Future-Proofing Energy 
Transport Law, 94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 827, 848-49 (2017). 
8  U.S. Energy Information Administration, Electricity explained, available at: 
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/delivery-to-consumers.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2020). 
9  Amy L. Stein, Regulating Reliability, 54 Hous. L. Rev. 1119, 1199 (2017). 
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transmitting electricity in interstate commerce (i.e., the transmission network) and the sale in 
interstate commerce of electricity for resale (i.e., wholesale sales).10  States regulate retail sales, 
the distribution network, and the siting and permitting of transmission and sometimes 
distribution facilities.11  State commissions are also frequently responsible for implementing the 
energy policies of the states. 
Up until the late 20th century, electricity was provided throughout the country by 
vertically-integrity utilities that held monopoly ownership over the entire supply chain of the 
electricity commodity.12  These utilities were compensated for the service they provided through 
cost-of-service-rates, formulated to allow utilities to recover their revenue requirement.13  Put 
simply, the cost-based revenue requirement is calculated by summing the utilities’ operating 
expenses, taxes, depreciation, and the return on capital investments.14  The return on capital 
investments is the utilities’ total capital expenditures (referred to as the “rate base”) minus 
depreciation multiplied by an allowed rate of return.15  Cost-based rates are administratively 
established by FERC or state commissions, depending on the nature of the service as wholesale 
or retail, and are statutorily required to be “just and reasonable.”16 
In an effort to foster competition and benefit from competitively established supply 
prices, many states in the late 1990s deregulated energy generation and directed utilities to divest 
                                                 
10  16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1), (f). 
11  Jim Lazar, Electricity Regulation in the US: A Guide, 14-15 (2d. 2016), available at: 
https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/rap-lazar-electricity-regulation-US-june-2016.pdf. 
12  Oxenham, supra note 2, at 589. 
13  Lazar, supra note 10, at 49. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  16 U.S.C. § 824d. 
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themselves of these assets.17  Between 1996 to 2000, 24 states at least partially deregulated 
electricity supply, but this momentum towards market “restructuring” stalled after the California 
energy crisis in 2000-01.18  Competitive electricity supply was also aided by the formation of 
RTOs/ISOs, at FERC’s behest, which facilitated competitive and dynamic energy markets in 
regions no longer dominated by vertically-integrated utilities.19  Each RTO/ISO market is 
distinct, but they can consist of separate markets for energy, capacity, and ancillary services, 
which are described in more detail below.20 
b. Description of Electric Storage Technologies and Their Benefits 
 
Electric storage has become increasingly relevant in recent years because of the declining 
costs of certain technologies and ESRs’ theoretical ability to complement variable renewable 
energy generation resources.21  FERC defines an ESR asset as “a resource capable of receiving 
electric energy from the grid and storing it for later injection of electricity back to the grid 
regardless of where the resource is located on the electrical system.”22  This seemingly simple 
definition belies the complex problems presented by emerging electric storage technologies, 
                                                 
17  Scott Hempling, Regulating Public Utility Performance: The Law of Market Structure, Pricing and Jurisdiction 
393 (2013); Lazar, supra note 11, at 10, 90 (showing cartographically which states have and have not 
restructured). 
18  John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity Restructuring, 25 Energy L.J. 273, 286 (2004). 
19  Jonas J. Monast, Electricity Competition and the Public Good: Rethinking Markets and Monopolies, 90 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 667, 67-78 (2019). 
20  See, e.g., ISO New England, Inc., Administering the Wholesale Electricity Markets, available at: 
https://www.iso-ne.com/about/what-we-do/three-roles/administering-markets (last viewed May 2, 2020) 
(describing the markets administered by ISO New England, Inc.).  
21  Schmitt & Sanford, supra note 6, at 457. 
22  Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent 
System Operators, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,718, at P 10 (2016). 
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particularly in the context of a traditional electric grid based on technologies that fit distinctly a 
generation, transmission, or distribution classification.23 
Although it is common to refer to electric storage in a general sense, this term includes a 
broad range of diverse technologies that offer distinct capabilities.  Historically, the most 
widespread ESR technology from a capacity basis has been hydroelectric pumped storage.24  As 
its name implies, pumped hydro stores potential kinetic energy by pumping water up to an 
elevated retaining pool and then, when power is in demand, releasing that water down through a 
turbine.25  Like other forms of gravitational storage, pumped hydro is capital intensive, but also 
provides relatively high capacity values and long discharge durations.26   
Lithium-ion batteries are currently the most popular form of new ESRs due to their 
declining costs.27  A form of chemical electric storage, lithium-ion batteries typically have 
discharge durations of around four hours and fast response times.28  Flywheels are another 
electric storage technology that is already widely employed to provide grid support.29  Flywheels 
store kinetic energy by using electrical energy to drive a motor that spins a mechanical device to 
increase rotational speed.30  These ESRs have short discharge durations, but have fast response 
                                                 
23  Utilization of Electric Storage Resources for Multiple Services When Receiving Cost-Based Rate Recovery, 
Policy Statement, 158 FERC ¶ 61,051, at P 2 (2017) (“FERC Policy Statement”). 
24  Krista Hughes & Stacey Simone Garfinkle, Planning for a Rainy Day: The Future of Energy Storage and the 
Policies Driving Its Growth, 32-SPG Nat. Resources & Env't 31, 33 (2018) 
25  Id. 
26  K&L Gates LLP, Energy Storage Handbook, 7-8 (November 2019) 
27  Schmitt & Sanford, supra note 6, at 457. 
28  Environmental and Energy Study Institute, Fact Sheet: Energy Storage (2019) (Feb. 22, 2019), available at: 
https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/energy-storage-2019.  
29  Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid: Energy Storage and 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 42 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 139, 152-53 (2018). 
30  K&L Gates LLP, supra note 26, at 7. 
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and ramp rates, making them an effective provider of certain ancillary services such as frequency 
response.31  There are numerous other forms of ESRs, including, in part, flow batteries, 
compressed air, fuel cells, and thermal energy storage, but the above examples demonstrate the 
diversity of services these technologies can provide.32 
The benefits offered by ESRs are possibly as diverse as the technologies themselves.  
From a public policy perspective, the principal value of ESRs is their ability to complement 
variable renewable energy, such as solar and wind, and thereby reduce the dependence on carbon 
emitting fossil fuel electric generation technologies.33  As explained above, the grid was built 
around the simultaneous production and consumption of electricity.  However, ESRs are able to 
store electricity that is produced at one time to meet demand at a later time.  Because production 
from variable renewable energy is dependent on intermittent resources, e.g., when the wind 
blows or sun shines, ESRs can complement these generators by releasing stored energy on 
cloudy or windless days, or temporally shifting excess production to meet demand arising later in 
time.34 
                                                 
31  Id. 
32  Id. at 8-9. 
33  Klass, supra note 7, at 10754.  While intuitive, the ability of ESR to actually displace fossil fuel-based 
generation depends on how ESRs are deployed.  In certain cases, increased ESR deployment can actually cause 
an increase in emissions by allowing baseload power plants, such as coal generators, to meet a higher 
proportion of demand when variability is stabilized.  Revesz & Unel, supra note 29, at 157. 
34  In California, a high penetration of solar created the infamous “duck curve”, which is the visual description of 
the daily demand curve, net of solar.  Julie Blunden, The Case for Long-Duration Storage: Net Electricity Load 
in Calif. Is 5 Years Ahead of Schedule, Greentech Media (2015), available at: 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/california-is-already-hitting-its-2020-duck-curve#gs.OTk4Lvk.  
As solar generation ebbs late in the day when many people were returning home and increasing electricity usage 
in their homes, the demand curve increases steeply, necessitating more high-ramping generation, such as 
natural-gas fired power.  Id.  ESRs would be well positioned to address the increased net demand that causes 




ESRs’ participation in electric markets as both supply and demand also enables these 
resources to arbitrage electric prices by charging when demand and prices are low and 
discharging when demand and prices are high.35  As ESRs proliferate and increase participation 
in electric markets, their influence on supply and demand will result in more stable electric prices 
for consumers.36  Relatedly, electric storage’s ability to meet demand spikes (i.e., “peak” 
demand) also displaces the significant capital-intensive infrastructure necessary to address these 
temporary anomalies in consumption patterns.37  This displaced infrastructure is dominated by 
natural gas-fired “peaker plants” that exist almost exclusively to meet peak demand.38   
ESRs can also allow the utility to defer investments in transmission and distribution 
infrastructure needed to meet increased electricity demand.39  Transmission and distribution 
networks have limited capacity, which can become constrained as electricity demand spikes or 
increases over time.40  An ESR built downstream from a transmission or distribution constraint 
can provide relief by charging during periods when the system is unconstrained and discharge 
when a constraint arises.41  Such an ESR can defer network upgrades and prolong the useful life 
of the system.42   
                                                 
35  Schmitt & Sanford, supra note 6, at 467. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. at 469. 
38  Krista Hughes & Stacey Simone Garfinkle, Planning for a Rainy Day: The Future of Energy Storage and the 
Policies Driving Its Growth, 32-SPG Nat. Resources & Env't 31, 32 (2018); Peter Maloney, Nearly 1/3 of 
planned gas peakers at risk from energy storage, GTM finds, Utility Dive (March 20, 2018), available at: 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/nearly-13-of-planned-gas-peakers-at-risk-from-energy-storage-gtm-
finds/519577/.  
39  Garrett Fitzgerald, et al., The Economics of Battery Energy Storage, Rocky Mountain Institute, 15 (2015). 
40  Id. 
41  C. Baird Brown, Financing at the Grid Edge, 48 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10785, 10788 (2018). 
42  Schmitt & Sanford, supra note 6, at 460. 
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Perhaps even more so than conventional generation, ESRs are adept at providing 
ancillary services, which are “[t]hose services that are necessary to support the transmission of 
capacity and energy from resources to loads while maintaining reliable operation of the 
Transmission Service Provider's transmission system in accordance with good utility practice.”43  
Ancillary services include both market services, such as frequency regulation, and cost-based 
services, including reactive supply and voltage control.44  Finally, ESRs can bolster general 
system reliability by relieving overloaded grids, mitigating weather related outages, and 
providing black start services.45 
c. Monetizing the Value Stack 
 
Although ESRs potentially offer a diverse array of benefits, not all of the services that 
ESRs can provide are currently monetizable, particularly for a single resource that provides a 
number of different services.  Many of the services that ESRs can provide can be grouped into 
two general categories: market services and grid services.46  As explained above, market services 
refer to the energy, capacity, and ancillary services markets administered by RTOs/ISOs.47  Grid 
                                                 
43  North. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp., Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards (2020), available at: 
https://www.nerc.com/files/glossary_of_terms.pdf.  
44  Schmitt & Sanford, supra note 6, at 460; Fitzgerald, supra note 40, at 15. 
45  Schmitt & Sanford, supra note 6, at 467 (“black start services are used ‘to energize transmission and 
distribution lines and provide station power to bring power plants on line after a catastrophic failure of the 
grid.’”) (quoting Abbas A. Akhil et al., DOE/EPRI Electricity Storage Handbook in Collaboration with 
NRECA, Sandia National Lab, 10 (July 2013). 
46  A third value that potentially can be stacked are customer services, which are the bill-management and 
incentive program values provided by a customer-sited, behind-the-meter ESRs, including reduced demand 
charges, time-of-use management, and back-up power.  Firtzgerald, supra note 39, at 5.  However, these 
services are outside the scope of this paper, which focuses on front-of-the-meter, utility-scale ESRs. 
47  Firtzgerald, supra note 39, at 15. 
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services are traditionally cost-based transmission and distribution services, such as reliability and 
congestion relief.48   
In the market, the most obvious source of revenue for ESRs is through energy arbitrage – 
buying power when the price is low and selling power when the price is high.49  Energy storage 
could also receive revenue from capacity markets, in regions where such markets exist, by 
committing to meet projected future demand for a delivery year one to three years into the future, 
depending on the particular RTO/ISO construct.50  The ability to quickly charge and discharge 
means that ESRs are also well equipped to meet the demand for many ancillary services; these 
markets have historically been the primary source of revenue for many electric storage 
technologies.51  However, the demand for ancillary services is limited and finite, resulting in 
increasingly undependable market revenue as ESRs proliferate.52  
Unlike for energy, capacity, and certain ancillary services that storage could provide, 
there is currently no market for transmission and distribution services.  This is significant 
because, as the Brattle Group found, “30-40% of the total system-wide benefits of storage 
investments are associated with reliability, transmission, and distribution functions that are not 
reflected in wholesale market prices and, thereof, cannot be captured by merchant storage 
investors.”53  Consequently, the inability for ESRs to receive revenue for transmission and 
                                                 
48  Id. at 5.   
49  Forrester, supra note 6, at 51.  
50  Id. 
51  Derek Sackler, New battery storage on shaky ground in ancillary service markets, Utility Dive (Nov. 14, 2019), 
available at: https://www.utilitydive.com/news/new-battery-storage-on-shaky-ground-in-ancillary-service-
markets/567303/.  
52  Id. 
53  Judy Chang, et al., The Value of Distributed Electricity Storage in Texas, The Brattle Group, 2 (November 





distribution services, along with compensation for market services, prevents ESRs from reaching 
their full capabilities and is inefficient from an economic perspective.   
However, enabling ESRs to receive revenue for multiple services presents a challenge for 
regulators that are wedded to the idea that the entire cost of transmission and distribution assets 
must be recoverable through cost-of-service rates.  As explained in more detail below, 
introducing market revenues raises a number of issues that the traditional cost-of-service model 
is ill-equipped to handle, including the potential for being compensated twice for the same 
service (i.e., “double recovery”) and determining when an ESR should provide each service.  As 
explained in the following sections, first in regards to FERC and then state commissions, ESRs 
are not realizing their full capabilities under the current regulatory structures, but the situation is 
evolving.  Establishing consistent sources of revenue for the full value stack is vital to enable 
ESRs to unlock investment opportunities.54 
III. ELECTRIC STORAGE AS A TRANSMISSION ASSET AND 
MARKET PARTICIPANT 
 
FERC has issued storage policies and directives that address the participation of electric 
storage in both transmission planning and ISO/RTO markets.  In response, several RTOs/ISOs 
have made efforts to adapt their existing market rules and transmission policies to accommodate 
ESRs.  Most notably, CAISO, the Midcontinent Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. 
(“MISO”), and the Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”) are exploring reforms for storage as a 
transmission asset (“SATA”).   
 
 
                                                 
54  Schmitt & Sanford, supra note 6, at 488. 
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FERC has required RTOs/ISOs to consider non-wire alternatives, which can include 
ESRs, in transmission planning since it issued FERC Order Nos. 890 and 1000.55  Through these 
orders, FERC adopted several significant measures to reform transmission planning.  One such 
measure was to “require the comparable consideration of transmission and non-transmission 
alternatives in the regional transmission planning process.”56  FERC Order No. 1000 also 
requires transmission planners to consider public policy requirements established under state and 
federal law and non-transmission alternatives in transmission planning.57  However, FERC did 
“not establish minimum requirements governing which non-transmission alternatives should be 
considered or the appropriate metrics to measure non-transmission alternatives against 
transmission alternatives.”58  Further, FERC explicitly declined to address cost allocation for 
non-transmission alternatives.59   
Although Order No. 1000 does not specifically mention electric storage, FERC did 
approve cost-based recovery for battery ESRs through transmission rates in Western Grid Dev. 
LLC, 130 FERC ¶ 61,056, reh’g denied 133 FERC ¶ 61,029 (2010) (“Western Grid”).  The 
battery storage was to provide transmission service to solve existing reliability problems on the 
                                                 
55  Order No. 890, Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266 
(2007); Order No. 1000, Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities, 136 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,051, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (2011) (“Order No. 1000”). 
56  Order No. 1000 at P 155. 
57  Id. at P 203. 
58  Id. at P 155. 
59  Id. At P 779. Cost allocation deals with assigning responsibility for recoverable utility costs among ratepayers.  
Jim Lazer, Dividing the Pie: Cost Allocation, the First Step in the Rate Design Process, Regulatory Assistance 
Project, available at: https://www.raponline.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/appendix-a-smart-rate-design-
2015-aug-31.pdf (last viewed Apr. 27, 2020). 
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CAISO grid, at a lower cost than traditional transmission upgrades.60  The proposal approved by 
FERC included a commitment to forego any sales into the wholesale energy markets, and FERC 
noted that the ESRs would “not be bid into the CAISO markets or be market participants in any 
way."61  Based on the specific circumstances and characteristics of the proposal, the Commission 
found that that the battery projects were wholesale transmission facilities subject to its 
jurisdiction.62  For obvious reasons, Western Grid is somewhat unsatisfying because its facts did 
not require that FERC address the critical issue of how the Commission would deal with a multi-
function storage project that provides both transmission services and also bids stored energy into 
the energy or ancillary markets. 
ii. Market 
 
The participation of ESRs in markets was addressed most prominently in FERC’s recent 
Order No. 841, which sought to remove barriers for electric storage participation in wholesale 
capacity, energy, and ancillary services markets.63  Order No. 841 directed RTOs/ISOs to revise 
their tariffs to develop a participation model that better incorporates electric storage into the 
market, including implementing processes that accommodate the physical and operational 
characteristics of electric storage systems.64  Specifically, Order No. 841 included the following 
requirements for each RTO’s/ISO’s participation model: allow electric storage resources to be 
eligible to participate in all capacity, energy, and ancillary services markets that the resource is 
                                                 
60  Western Grid at P 3. 
61  Id. at P 50. 
62  Id. at PP 43, 56. 
63  Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent 
System Operators, Order No. 841, 162 FERC ¶ 61,127 (2018) (“Order No. 841”), order on reh’g, Order No. 
841-A, 167 FERC ¶ 61,154 (2019). 
64  Order No. 841 at P 3. 
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technically capable of providing; ensure that storage resources under the participation model can 
be dispatched and establish the wholesale market clearing price as a wholesale seller and/or 
buyer; account for electric storage’s physical and operational characteristics (via bidding 
parameters or other means); and set a minimum size requirement for storage resources’ 
participation in the RTO/ISO markets of not more than 100 kilowatts (“kW”).65   
iii. Multiple Use ESRs 
 
While FERC has provided a clear mandate that ESRs should be able to participate in both 
market and transmission planning to the extent they are technically able and/or cost effective, 
FERC has not established definitive rules for multi-use ESRs.  FERC has, however, issued a 
Policy Statement on January 19, 2017 to provide guidance on ESRs receiving both cost-based 
recovery for transmission services and market-based revenue for energy and ancillary services.66  
FERC felt the need to reconcile its decision in Western Grid with The Nev. Hydro Co., Inc., 122 
FERC ¶ 61,272 (2008) (“Nevada Hydro”), in which FERC denied a proposal that would 
designate a pumped hydro ESR as a transmission facility and to recover its costs through 
transmission rates.67  Under the Nevada Hydro proposal, CAISO would take operational control 
of the pumped hydro ESR, allowing the ESR to serve a variety of ancillary service needs for the 
CAISO market, and Nevada Hydro would consistently bid the ESR's stored energy into the 
CAISO market at zero.68  CAISO opposed this proposal, arguing that its independence as the 
                                                 
65  Id. at P 4. 
66  Utilization of Electric Storage Resources for Multiple Services When Receiving Cost-Based Rate Recovery, 
Policy Statement, 158 FERC ¶ 61,051 (2017) (“FERC Policy Statement”). 
67  Id. at PP 1, 3. 
68  Nevada Hydro at P 74. 
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market administrator would be compromised.69  FERC found that the purpose of CAISO's 
transmission rates was to recover the costs of transmission facilities under CAISO's control, not 
as compensation for what FERC referred to as "bundled services."70  Further, according to 
FERC, allowing the pumped hydro ESR to receive a guaranteed revenue stream through 
transmission rates would create an undue preference for the pumped hydro ESR compared to 
other similarly situated pumped hydro generators.71  
In the Policy Statement, FERC confirmed that “there may be approaches different from 
Western Grid’s approach under which an electric storage resource may receive cost-based rate 
recovery and, if technically capable, provide market-based services that may address [FERC’s] 
concerns.”72  FERC rejected claims that allowing market and cost-based recovery will adversely 
impact other market competitors.73  However, FERC explained that the following issues must be 
addressed before multi-use ESRs are permitted:  
(1) the potential for combined cost-based and market-based rate 
recovery to result in double recovery of costs by the electric storage 
resource owner or operator to the detriment of cost-based 
ratepayers; (2) the potential for cost recovery through cost-based 
rates to inappropriately suppress competitive prices in the wholesale 
electric markets to the detriment of other competitors who do not 
receive such cost-based rate recovery; and (3) the level of control in 
the operation of an electric storage resource by an RTO/ISO that 
could jeopardize its independence from market participants.74 
                                                 
69  Id. at P 83. 
70  Id. at P 62. 
71  Id. at P 83. 
72  FERC Policy Statement at P 9. 
73  Id. at P 21. 
74  Id. at P 13. 
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To address the potential for double-recovery, FERC provided several potential options, 
including 1) recovering the full costs of the ESR through cost-based rates and crediting all 
market revenues back to customers, and 2) recovering part of the costs of the ESR and crediting 
part of the market revenues back to customers.75  Further, to ensure the independence of the 
RTO/ISO, “the provision of market-based rate services should be under the control of the electric 
storage resource owner or operator, rather than the RTO/ISO.”76  Finally, for multi-use ESRs, the 




In response to the FERC Policy Statement, CAISO initiated a stakeholder proceeding to 
evaluate “the circumstances and conditions when storage facilities [CAISO] finds through the 
transmission planning process to be needed to provide a reliability service can also provide 
market-based services.”78  In its second straw proposal issued on October 16, 2018, CAISO 
again indicated a willingness to consider electric storage whose purpose is to meet transmission 
needs.79  CAISO offered four potential cost recovery options for storage that provides both 
transmission and market services:  
                                                 
75  Id. at PP 17-18. 
76  Id. at P 19. 
77  Id. at P 26. 
78  California Independent System Operator, Inc., Storage as a Transmission Asset: Enabling storage assets 
providing regulated cost-of-service-based transmission service to access market revenues, 9 (2nd Revised 
Straw Proposal, Oct. 16, 2018) (“CAISO Straw Proposal”). 
79  Id. at 12. In particular, CAISO noted, however, that “the majority of the economic benefits for storage projects 
appear to occur when acting as resources competing against other market resources.”  Id.  CAISO also proposed 
to provide a SATA notification to indicate to SATA resource owners when a SATA resource will be permitted 
to participate in the market.  Id. at 7. 
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1. Full cost-of-service based cost recovery with complete energy market crediting back to 
ratepayer;80 
2. Partial cost-of-service based cost recovery and retain energy market revenues;81 
3. Full cost-of-service recovery with partial market revenue sharing between owner and 
ratepayer;82 and 
4. Partial cost-of-service recovery with partial market revenue sharing between owner and 
ratepayer.83 
Referring to option one, CAISO acknowledged that “[t]he most significant challenge with 
this model is that it provides little incentive for the [ESR] to participate in the market.” 84   To 
address this challenge, CAISO is considering imposing a “must offer obligation” to force SATA 
resources to participate in the market when they are permitted to do so (i.e., when they are not 
providing transmission services).85  CAISO also explained that a drawback for option two is the 
need to forecast market revenues to establish a partial cost-of-service rate, along with the risk 
that those revenues will not ultimately be realized.86  The third option is designed to provide 
incentives for market participation not present in the full cost-of-service option, while mitigating 
                                                 
80  Id. at 19-21. 
81  Id. at 21-23. 
82  Id. at 23-25.  CAISO present two options for splitting market revenue: “The first option is simply that any 
market revenues would be split, the second option is that the resource would have to first surpass a given 
amount of market revenues before it would be permitted to retain some portion of market revenues.”  Id. at 24. 
83  This option was added in a CAISO presentation of its second straw proposal.  Karl Meeusen, Storage as a 
Transmission Asset: Enabling storage assets providing regulated cost-of-service-based transmission service to 
access market revenues, California Independent System Operator, Inc., 8 (Jan. 14, 2019), available at: 
http://www.caiso.com/InitiativeDocuments/Presentation-Storage-TransmissionAsset-Jan142019.pdf. 
84  CAISO Straw Proposal at 21. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. at 22. 
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some of the financial uncertainties that exist in the partial cost of service approach.87  CAISO 
suspended its SATA initiative pending the outcome of a related distributed energy resource 
proceeding and expects to resume the SATA initiative in the second half of 2020.88 
Perhaps unsurprisingly considering the only two FERC SATA cases, Western and 
Nevada Hydro, emanated from the CAISO region, the other RTOs/ISOs are generally well 
behind CAISO in considering multi-use ESRs.  MISO is the only RTO/ISO to actually submit a 
SATA tariff proposal to FERC, but that proposal is for SATA to “operate for a transmission 
purpose only.”89  Under the MISO proposal, SATA “may only participate in MISO’s markets to 
the extent necessary to receive energy from and inject energy into the transmission system to 
provide the services for which the [SATA] was included in the [MISO transmission plan] and 
may not otherwise participate in the energy and operating reserves markets and/or the planning 
resource auction.”90  FERC accepted the MISO proposal on March 10, 2020, subject to 
additional proceedings.91  According to an American Transmission Company Issue Submission 
Form, MISO will begin a stakeholder proceeding in early 2020 to develop mechanisms “to 
enable storage as transmission assets to be used to provide market services when available.”92 
SPP has also initiated its own SATA stakeholder proceeding, which will apparently 
address multi-use ESRs.  On January 7, 2020, SPP issued a whitepaper identifying issues that 
                                                 
87  Id. at 23. 
88  California Independent System Operator, Inc., Revised Draft Policy Initiatives Catalog, 17 (Aug. 15, 2019). 
89  Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 170 FERC ¶ 61,186, at P 12 (2020). 
90  Id. 
91  Id. at P 1. 





need to be resolved to take advantage of the benefits offered by ESRs.93  The SPP whitepaper 
identified the following goals: 
1. Capitalize on ESRs’ flexibility for acting as both generation and transmission.  
2. Maximize ESRs’ potential for ensuring reliable and cost-effective energy delivery.  
3. Develop cost-recovery mechanisms for ESRs used as either transmission or generation, 
or as both.  
4. Create procedures and tariff language to resolve reliability and operational issues that 
arise when ESRs are used as generation and/or transmission.94 
SPP acknowledged that “ESRs can serve as an alternative to traditional transmission 
facilities to resolve short-term reliability issues such as voltage support and congestion.”95  
Further, due to “ESRs’ flexibility, it may later be determined that an ESR can also provide 
energy and related services” in addition to transmission services.96  One issue SPP identified 
with multi-use ESRs is how to address market revenues for electric storage receiving cost 
recovery as a transmission asset.97  Specifically, SPP stated: 
An ESR that is receiving revenues from both energy and 
transmission may be in an unfair competitive position when 
transmission revenues, including a rate-of-return, reduce costs of 
Integrated Marketplace participation.  An ESR could either earn a 
return in excess of the allowed return for a transmission asset 
                                                 
93  Southwest Power Pool, Inc., Electric Storage Resources White Paper (Jan. 7, 2020) (“SPP Whitepaper”).  The 
purpose of the whitepaper was to identify issues and, accordingly, does not provide conclusions.  Id. at 7.  The 
SPP Strategic Planning Committee discussed the whitepaper during its January 15, 2020 meeting and, together 
with the Markets and Operations Policy Committee, will be developing a framework to address the issues raised 
in the report to share at its April meeting. Southwest Power Pool, Inc., The Org Report: February 2020, 
available at: https://www.spp.org/documents/61645/2020%2002%20february%20org%20report.pdf. 
94  SPP Whitepaper at 3. 
95  Id. at 10. 
96  Id. at 16. 
97  Id. at 14. 
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(“double-dip”) or bid into the market at lower than its marginal 
cost.98 
IV. THE STATE EXPERIENCE  
 
Recent state policy momentum is driving an increasing regulatory focus on electric 
storage.  A number of states have set specific electric storage procurement targets, including 
Arizona (3,000 megawatt (“MW”) by 2030), California (1,325 MW by 2024), Massachusetts 
(1,000 MWh by 2025), New York (1,500 MW by 2025 and 3,000 MW by 2030), and New 
Jersey (600 MW by 2021 and 2,000 MW by 2030).99  Others are funding demonstration projects 
to acquire a better understanding of how electric storage can further state policy goals.100  
Motivated, in part, by the signals provided by their legislators, state utility commissions are 
sorting through the details of incorporating an increasing amount of electric storage, including 
interconnection rules and integrated resource plans as well as other issues.101   
More pertinent to this paper, however, is how these state utility commissions address the 
different revenue streams available for the different services multi-use electric storage can 
provide.  As the following demonstrates, this is a nascent issue for state utility commissions, and 
concrete decision-making has been limited. 
The potential value ESRs provide through the deferral of distribution investments has 
generally been acknowledged by states, even if the number of approved ESR distribution 
projects is limited.  For example, the Arizona Public Service Company developed the 2 MW, 8 
                                                 
98  Id. Similarly, SPP raised concerns that an ESR that is used for resource adequacy and also recovers its costs 
through transmission rates may be assigning costs attributable to resource adequacy to transmission customers 
who don’t receive that benefit. Id. at 17. 
99  Environmental and Energy Study Institute, supra note 28. 
100  Jeremy Twitchell, A Review of State-Level Policies on Electrical Energy Storage, Current 
Sustainable/Renewable Energy Reports 6, 38 (2019).  
101  See, e.g., K&L Gates, supra note 26, at 26-50 (reviewing the ESR laws, regulations, and policies of states). 
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megawatt-hour (“MWh”) Arizona Punkin Center battery system, which went into operation in 
2018, in lieu of rebuilding 17 miles of distribution lines.102  ESRs also participate in energy 
markets, such the 2 MW Vaca-Dixon and 4 MW Yerba Buena battery storage systems Pacific 
Gas & Electric Company (“PG&E”), which were the first ESRs to participate in CAISO’s 
markets.103  However, it does not appears that any multi-use ESRs are currently in operation, 
although, as elaborated below, such projects are being planned for the future.  The following 
sections will first address the guidance provided by state utility commissions on multi-use ESRs 
and then will review examples of planned multi-use ESR projects in these states to add further 
detail of how these projects expect to monetize the ESR value stack. 
a. State Commission Consideration of Multi-Use ESRs 
 
In the limited occasions that ESRs have been considered by states in utility planning, 
approaches have been mixed.  On one extreme is Texas, where utilities are forbidden by law 
from owning ESRs and the Public Utility Commission of Texas (“PUCT”) initially rejected an 
application submitted by AEP Texas, Inc. to install $1.6 million of electric storage in lieu of an 
expansion to its distribution system that would cost $6 million to $17 million.104  In contrast, as 
explained below, several states and their commissions are considering how to realize the full 
                                                 
102  Brenda Chew, et al., Non-Wires Alternatives, Smart Electric Power Alliance, Peak Load Management Alliance, 
and E4TheFuture, 42 (November 2018), available at: https://e4thefuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018-
Non-Wires-Alternatives-Report_FINAL.pdf. 
103  Pacific Gas and Electric Company, EPIC Final Report (Sept. 13, 2016), available at: 
https://www.pge.com/pge_global/common/pdfs/about-pge/environment/what-we-are-doing/electric-program-
investment-charge/PGE-EPIC-Project-1.01.pdf. 
104  Application of AEP Texas North Company for Regulatory Approvals Related to the Installation of Utility-Scale 
Battery Facilities, Docket No. 46368, Order, 4 (PUCT, Feb. 15, 2018).  While the PUCT initiated a rulemaking 
to explore this issue further, no action has been taken in that docket since initial comments and reply comments. 




capabilities of ESRs by enabling these resources to provide both grid services and market 
services and to be duly compensated.  
i. New York 
 
Public Service Law §74 directed the New York Public Service Commission (“PSC”) to 
establish the state’s ESR procurement goals and associated deployment policy.  Among the list 
of statutorily prescribed considerations for this deployment policy was “avoided or deferred costs 
associated with transmission, distribution, and/or generation capacity” and “cost-
effectiveness.”105  Pursuant to this statutory directive, the New York PSC issued a decision on 
December 13, 2018 (“Storage Order”), which directed New York utilities to issue Requests for 
Proposals (“RFPs”) for ESRs developed by competitive bidders.106  The ESRs would be 
developed and owned by the competitive bidders, but operated by the utilities.  According to the 
New York PSC, the ESRs could provide the following services “(1) local reliability services; (2) 
local load relief; (3) local environmental benefits derived by reducing use of peaking units for 
contingency purposes; and, (4) wholesale services.”107  Recognizing the risks and rewards 
inherent in forecasting market revenues, the New York PSC permitted competitive bidders to 
                                                 
105  N.Y.P.S. Law §74(2). 
106  In the Matter of Energy Storage Deployment Program, Case 18-E-0130, Order Establishing Energy Storage 
Goal and Deployment Policy (N.Y.P.S.C., Dec. 13, 2018) (“NY Storage Order”).  The New York PSC prefers 
competitively procured ESRs, but explained that utility ownership may be permissible where ESRs on the 
utility’s system that “will be used to support and enhance reliable system operations.”  Reforming the Energy 
Vision, Case 14-M-0101, Order Adopting Regulatory Policy Framework and Implementation Plan (N.Y.P.S.C., 
Feb. 26, 2015) (“REV Framework Order”).  In the REV Framework Order, the New York PSC delineated the 
circumstances in which utility ownership would be considered, including where: “(1) procurement of DER has 
been solicited to meet a system need, and a utility has demonstrated that competitive alternatives proposed by 
non-utility parties are clearly inadequate or more costly than a traditional utility infrastructure alternative; (2) a 
project consists of energy storage integrated into distribution system architecture; (3) a project will enable low 
or moderate income residential customers to benefit from DERs where markets are not likely to satisfy the 
need; or (4) a project is being sponsored for demonstration purposes.”  NY Storage Order at 43 (citing REV 
Framework Order at 70). 
107  NY Storage Order at 54. 
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retain at least a portion of the market revenues received by the ESRs in exchange for the 
anticipated savings associated with competitive bids.108   
The New York PSC also specifically addressed “dual participation” for ESRs, a related, 
but not quite synonymous, concept to multi-use ESRs.109  Dual participation refers to the 
distributed energy resources, including distributed multi-use ESRs, that provide separate and 
distinct services to the utility and the market. 110  In regard to such dual participation resources, 
the New York PSC forbid unreasonable prohibitions or restrictions on providing multiple 
services, mandated that reliability services must receive priority, and proscribed double recovery 
for the same service.111 
ii. California 
 
California was an early mover on promoting ESRs, adopting a 1,325 MW by 2020 
electric storage procurement target in 2013.112  On January 11, 2018, the California Public 
Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) issued a Decision that adopted 11 rules for “multiple-use” 
                                                 
108  Id. 
109  Id. at 96. 
110  Id. The New York ISO defines dual participation as “the simultaneous enrollment of an individual resource, to 
provide services to the [New York ISO]-administered wholesale markets and to another entity (e.g., utility or 
host facility).”  New York Independent System Operator, Distributed Energy Resources Market Design 
Concept Proposal, 27 (December 2017).  Dual participation therefore includes, but is not limited to, multi-use 
ESRs. 
111  NY Storage Order at 99-100. 
112  Order Instituting Rulemaking Pursuant to Assembly Bill 2514 to Consider the Adoption of Procurement Targets 
for Viable and Cost-Effective Energy Storage Systems, Rulemaking 10-12-007, D.13-10-040, 2 (C.P.U.C., Dec. 
16, 2010).  The California ESR procurement program is guided by three purposes:  
1. Optimization of the grid, including peak reduction, contribution to reliability needs, or deferment of 
transmission and distribution upgrade investments;   
2. The integration of renewable energy; and   





ESRs.113  The CPUC acknowledged that “current market rules (i.e., utility standard contracts and 
program tariffs) do not support the ability of an energy resource to access, or ‘stack,’ more than 
one service, including any incremental values to the wholesale market, distribution grid, 
transmission system, resource adequacy requirements and customers.”114  The purpose of the 11 
rules, according to the CPUC, was “to promote the ability these storage resources to realize their 
full economic value when they are capable of providing multiple benefits and services to the 
electricity system.”115  In the context of Rule 4, the CPUC explicitly provides that ESRs, whether 
interconnected to the distribution system or the transmission system, may provide both grid and 
market services.116  Like the New York PSC, the CPUC’s rules for multi-use ESRs forbid double 
recovery and require that an ESR that provides reliability service must prioritize this service 
above other services (e.g., market services).117  
iii. Maryland 
 
In 2019, Maryland passed legislation directing distribution utilities to solicit and apply 
for Maryland PSC approval of between five to ten megawatts of electric storage projects to be 
operational by February 28, 2022.118  The bill, SB 573, provided that the ESRs would first 
provide grid and reliability services and then market services when not providing grid and 
                                                 
113  Order Instituting Rulemaking to consider policy and implementation refinements to the Energy Storage 
Procurement Framework and Design Program (D.13-10-040, D.14-10-045) and related Action Plan of the 
California Energy Storage Roadmap, Rulemaking 15-03-011, D.18-01-003 (C.P.U.C., Jan. 17, 2018) (“11 
Rules Order”).  The CPUC considers multiple-use ESRs to be “those that provide multiple services to different 
entities or jurisdictions.”  Id. at 5. 
114  Id. at 9. 
115  Id. at 2. 
116  Id. at 11. 
117  Id. at 11-12. 
118  Md. Code, Pub. Util. § 7-216(b). 
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reliability services and delineated several potential business models for project applications: 1) 
utility ownership and operation of the ESRs; 2) third-party ownership and operation, with the 
utility contracting for grid services; and 3) utility ownership and operation for grid services and 
third-party operation for market services.119  Project applications in response to the SB 573 
solicitations must estimate the “funds expected to be received from wholesale market 
transactions” and “the value of any distribution investment deferral or replacement due to the 
project.”120  When evaluating applications, the Maryland PSC must consider, inter alia, the value 
provided by deferral of transmission investments, funds generated by wholesale markets, and 
whether the ESRs capture multiple value streams.121 
On August 23, 2019, the Maryland PSC issued an Order directing 1) the investor-owned 
utilities to solicit electric storage projects in accordance with SB 573 and 2) an Energy Storage 
Working Group to develop a “detailed list of the types of value streams each project application 
should consider.”122  Among the value streams identified by the Working Group in response was 
avoided investment in the distribution grid.123  The Working Group identified two monetizable 
                                                 
119  Md. Code, Pub. Util. § 7-216(c)(1)-(3).  These business models were originally presented to the Maryland PSC 
on January 14, 2019 (revised on May 15, 2019) by the Energy Storage Working Group in a “Proof of 
Regulatory Concept Program to test innovative regulatory and business models for energy storage that have the 
potential to reduce ratepayer costs and provide benefits to customers, utilities, competitive storage providers, 
and the electric grid.” Proof of Regulatory Concept Program, PC 44, 6 (Md.P.S.C., May 15, 2019).  The 
legislation also provided a fourth business model, virtual power plants, which are aggregated distributed ESRs 
and not relevant to this paper.  Md. Code, Pub. Util. § 7-216(c)(4).   
120  Md. Code, Pub. Util. § 7-216(e). 
121  Md. Code, Pub. Util. § 7-216(k).  
122  In the Matter of Transforming Maryland’s Electric Distribution System to Ensure that Electric Service is 
Customer-Centered, Affordable, Reliable and Environmentally Sustainable in Maryland, In the Matter of the 
Maryland Energy Storage Pilot Program, PC 44, Case No. 9619, Order No. 89240, 6 (Md.P.S.C., Aug. 23, 
2019).  
123  In the Matter of Transforming Maryland’s Electric Distribution System to Ensure that Electric Service is 
Customer-Centered, Affordable, Reliable and Environmentally Sustainable in Maryland, In the Matter of the 
Maryland Energy Storage Pilot Program, PC 44, Case No. 9619, Submission of the PC 44 Energy Storage 
Working Group, 6 (Md.P.S.C., Dec. 31, 2019). 
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value streams for distribution – avoided or deferred transmission and distribution upgrades and 
"optionality," a term that was used to refer to the flexibility provided by ESRs to address 
changing needs of the electric system over time.124  The Working Group also recognized that 
ESRs “may be able to achieve revenues from the wholesale market”, but that any such revenues 
would depend on the market participation rules of the relevant RTO/ISO.125 
b. Multi-Use Storage Competitive Solicitations and Projects 
 
Consistent with state law, and pronouncements by their respective state utility 
commissions, utilities in New York and California are proceeding with multi-use ESR projects.  
While no such projects are currently operational, the details of the plans show the utilities’ 
intention to realize the full capabilities of ESRs.  These plans would provide value to customers 
by procuring grid solutions at reduced costs due to market revenue. 
i. New York 
 
As required by the New York PSC’s Storage Order, on February 11, 2019 Consolidated 
Edison Company of New York, Inc. (“ConEd”)126 and Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. 
(collectively, the “ConEd Utilities”)  submitted their joint Implementation Plan for a Competitive 
                                                 
124  Id. at 7.  The Working Group calculated the monetizable value provided by these two value streams as follows: 
1) avoided or deferred transmission and distribution upgrades = [PV of cost of the value of traditional 
investment during the life of the battery storage project] - [PV of battery storage project cost during the life of 
the battery storage project + any incurred traditional T & D costs] and 2) optionality value of storage = expected 
value (needed infrastructure investment) – cost of the storage solution.  The Working Group also provided a 
third value stream, hosting capacity, for which no recommendation for calculating the monetary value was 
provided.  Hosting capacity is meant to refer “to the amount of DERs that can be accommodated on the 
distribution system at a given time and at a given location under existing grid conditions and operations, without 
adversely impacting safety, power quality, reliability or other operational criteria, and without requiring 
significant infrastructure upgrades.”  Id. at 15-16. 
125  Id. at 10. 
126  ConEd serves New York City and is the largest electric distribution utility in New York.  Consolidated Edison 
Company of New York, Inc., Company Information, available at: https://www.coned.com/en/about-
us/company-information (last visited Apr. 27, 2020). 
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Direct Procurement of Scheduling and Dispatch Rights from Qualified Energy Storage 
Systems.127  The ConEd Utilities issued a joint RFP for directed procurement of 300 MW and 10 
MW, respectively, of dispatch rights from ESRs on July 15, 2019, modified on August 23, 
2019.128  Under the New York approach, the utilities do not directly procure the storage assets.  
Instead, they make contractual payments to successful bidders for the right to dispatch the 
ESR.129  The payments enable successful bidders to bring the storage facilities into commercial 
operation.130  
Under the terms of the Implementation Plan and RFP, competitive bids are to be assessed 
on both quantitative and qualitative scores.131  The quantitative score is the sum of market 
revenue, benefits to the distribution system,132 and environmental benefit, less the contract 
payments.133  When not utilizing the ESR for grid services, the ConEd Utilities will bid the ESRs 
                                                 
127  In the Matter of Energy Storage Deployment Program, Case 18-E-0130, Implementation Plan of Consolidated 
Edison Company of New York, Inc. and Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. for a Competitive Direct 
Procurement of Scheduling and Dispatch Rights from Qualified Energy Storage Systems (N.Y.P.S.C., Feb. 11, 
2019) (“ConEd Implementation Plan”).  
128  Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. and Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc., Request for 
Proposals, 1 (1st Revision, Aug. 23, 2019) (“ConEd RFP”), available at: https://www.coned.com/-
/media/files/coned/documents/business-partners/business-opportunities/bulk-energy-storage/bulk-storage-
request-for-proposals.pdf?la=en.  
129  NY Storage Order at 53-54. 
130  Bidders retain ownership and operational control of the ESR, but the ConEd Utilities will bid the ESR into the 
market and the bidder must operate the ESR in accordance with schedules established by the ConEd Utilities 
and the market administrator.  ConEd RFP at 3. 
131  Implementation Plan at 8.  First among qualitative factors is location, with the ConEd Utilities providing a map 
of “Preferred Load Areas.”  ConEd RFP at 11.  The other qualitative factors are: project viability, credit quality, 
adherence to terms, system design, bidding team experience, safety, and bidder concentration.  Id. at 11-12. 
132  More specifically, Distribution benefits are “quantifiable benefits associated with a storage system’s location in 
the [ConEd] and/or O&R distribution system.”  Id. at 10-11. 
133  Id. at 10.  
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into the markets of the New York Independent System Operator (“New York ISO”), receive the 
market revenue, and pay any market charges and the costs to charge the ESR.134   
Market revenue will be shared between the bidder, customers of the ConEd Utilities, and, 
potentially, the shareholders of the ConEd Utilities.135  Initially, market revenue is shared 
between the bidder and customers.136  The ConEd Utilities will recover their contract payments 
to bidders through a surcharge137 and the customers’ share of the revenues will be credited 
against this surcharge.138  To the extent the customer share of revenues exceeds contract 
payments, the excess “will be split on a 70/30 basis” between customers and ConEd 
shareholders.139  Bidders are instructed to consider potential market revenue when determining 
proposed contract payments.140 
Separate from its procurement pursuant to the New York PSC’s Storage Order, ConEd is 
also pursuing a Commercial Battery Storage Demonstration Project under New York’s 
Reforming the Energy Vision (“REV”).  The objective of the REV demonstration projects is to 
“demonstrate new business models, i.e. new revenue stream opportunities for third parties and 
utilities.”141  Utilities are permitted to recover the costs incurred as a result of these 
                                                 
134  ConEd Implementation Plan at 13. 
135  Id. at 13-14. 
136  Id. 
137  Id.  Ultimately, these contract payments will be included in the rate base of the ConEd Utilities, thereby not 
only recovering the contract payments, but also receiving a return on those payments from ratepayers.  Id. at 12. 
138  Id. at 13. 
139  Id. at 14. 
140  ConEd RFP at 4 (“It is strongly recommended that Bidders consider the value of market participation and all 
potential revenue sources for the energy storage Project in the post-Agreement period when determining an 
Offer Price.”). 
141  REV Framework Order at 115. 
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demonstration projects through rates.142  The ConEd demonstration project in partnership with 
GI Energy “to demonstrate how distributed, front of the meter (“FTM”) energy storage can 
provide transmission and distribution . . . support, earn wholesale market revenues, and increase 
the market size of participating customers by aligning the interests of [ConEd], customers, and 
third-party developers.”143   
The project will consist of four distribution interconnected batteries totaling 4.2 MW and 
4.4 MWh that will be developed by GI Energy and located on the properties of ConEd 
customers.144  The value provided by the project will be lease payments to the customer for the 
use of its site, transmission and distribution deferral for ConEd, and market revenue when the 
project is not providing transmission and distribution services that GI Energy will share with 
ConEd.145  As market revenues for the project are uncertain at this time, ConEd is supporting the 
financing of the batteries.146  However, ConEd anticipates that it will only pay “for the portion of 
the battery used for [transmission and distribution] benefit” for future projects under this 
business model.147  Accordingly, ConEd “will be able to lower cost of service for customers 
while enabling an increase in battery installations.”148  Although not applicable to this pilot 
                                                 
142  Id. at 116. 
143  Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision, Case 14-M-0101, REV 
Demonstration Project Quarterly Report Q4 2019, 3 (N.Y.P.S.C., Jan. 31, 2020).  
144  Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision, Case 14-M-0101, REV 
REV Demonstration Project Outline, 7 (N.Y.P.S.C., Jan. 20, 2017) (“REV Project Outline”).  
145  Proceeding on Motion of the Commission in Regard to Reforming the Energy Vision, Case 14-M-0101, 
Reforming the Energy Vision Demonstration Project Assessment Report, 7 (N.Y.P.S.C., May 18, 2017).  
146  REV Project Outline at 22. 
147  Id. at 8. 
148  Id. 
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project, in the future, ConEd expects to use a competitive process to select the lowest cost 
electric storage projects to meet ConEd’s needs.149  
ii. California 
 
In its 2016 Energy Storage Plan Decision, the CPUC approved the 2016 ESR 
procurement plans of PG&E and Southern California Edison (“SCE”) and authorized PG&E and 
SCE to explore innovative use cases to include in the 2016 solicitations, including electric 
storage that can facilitate distribution deferral.150  Among the projects submitted in response by 
PG&E was the Llagas Energy Storage project, a 20 MW lithium ion battery to be interconnected 
with the distribution grid.151  The Llagas project would be designed and constructed by Tesla, 
Inc., but would ultimately be owned and operated by PG&E pursuant to a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement.152  Under the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Llagas project would “maintain 
distribution reliability, participate in CAISO markets, and contribute to PG&E’s satisfaction of 
its [Resource Adequacy] requirements”, with priority given to the reliability services.153  PG&E 
would recover the costs of the Llagas project through distribution rates and the market revenues 
will be flowed back to customers, reducing the cost of the storage project.154 
The California Office of Ratepayer Advocates raised several arguments against approval 
of the Llagas project, including that it was inconsistent with the CPUC’s 11 rules for multi-use 
                                                 
149  Id. at 12. 
150  Application of Southern California Edison Company (U338E) for Approval of the Results of Its 2016 Energy 
Storage and Distribution Deferral Request for Offers, And Related Matter, A.17-12-002, A.17-12-003, D.18-
10-009, 3 (C.P.U.C., Oct. 19, 2018). 
151  Id. at 25. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. at 18, 25. 
154  Id. at 30-31. 
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ESRs and was not cost-effective compared to alternatives.155  The CPUC found that the Llagas 
project satisfied its 11 rules, as PG&E committed “to prioritize the Llagas capacity for its 
intended distribution reliability service.”156  Further, the project was found to be cost-effective 
because “when not only capital costs, but also expected market revenues, are taken into account, 
the Llagas project was one of the most economically viable projects among offers submitted in 
the PG&E’s 2016 Energy Storage and Distribution Deferral [Request for Offers].”157  
V. MULTIPLE USE ESRs LESSONS LEARNED FROM 
REGULATORY PROCEEDINGS  
 
Universally, regulators recognize the potential for ESR transmission and distribution 
deferral projects to reduce the costs ultimately borne by utility customers through market 
revenues.  For example, the New York PSC anticipates that competitively-bid storage solutions 
will incorporate savings resulting from market revenue and, in considering the PG&E Llagas 
project, the CPUC found that ESRs provide a cost-effective alternative to traditional grid 
solutions when market revenues are included. 
However, a single asset operating as both a market participant and a transmission and 
distribution deferral project raises several novel issues, and the decisions and planned projects 
described above provide a number of lessons that can inform the optimal path forward for multi-
use ESRs.  First and foremost, a multi-use ESR must provide priority to transmission and 
reliability services ahead of market services.  This is one of the principles established in FERC’s 
                                                 
155  Id. at 17, 25-26. 
156  Id. at 18. 
157  Id. at 26.  The CPUC also granted PG&E’s requested cost recovery mechanism set forth in the Llagas electric 
storage Purchase and Sale Agreement.  Id. at 35.  However, the CPUC cautioned that its approval is not 
precedential for future multi-use applications, including distribution deferral electric storage contracts.  Id.  The 
CPUC also said that its approval was subject to modification in the future, when it adopts a uniform policy for 
cost recovery for multi-use ESRs or distribution deferral electric storage contracts.  Id. 
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Policy Statement and nearly all other jurisdictions addressed above agree.  For example, 
reliability and distribution services are required to receive priority under the New York PSC’s 
Storage Order and the CPUC’s 11 rules for multiple-use ESRs.  Second, operational control 
should rest with a market participant, either the utility or a third-party operator, and should not be 
the responsibility of the market administrator, namely the RTO/ISO.  This principle also stems 
directly from the FERC Policy Statement in recognition of the conflict that could arise if a 
market administrator also acts as a market participant.   
Third, in order to incentivize efficient market participation, the market participant should 
retain at least a portion of the market revenue.  The necessity for such a profit motivation is 
recognized in New York, where the utilities’ RFP shares revenue with both the utility, which will 
be bidding into the market, and the bidder, which will be maintaining the ESR.  A must-offer 
obligation, as considered by CAISO, is an arbitrary administrative remedy that is inconsistent 
with efficient market principles.  For PG&E’s Llagas project, it appears that all market revenue 
will be flowed back to customers and, consequently, it is not clear what motivation PG&E would 
have to fully develop the market capabilities of that project. 
Finally, it appears that many states prefer competitive procurement of multi-use ESRs, 
compared to ESRs that are developed and owned by incumbent utilities without soliciting third-
party proposals under a competitive process.  There are several compelling justifications for this 
preference.  
 First, competitive procurements of multi-use ESRs benefit consumers by driving down 
the cost of ESRs.  Specifically, assuming the bidder submits a single price for the ESR, without 
any explicit provision for sharing market revenues, bids are implicitly reduced by the bidders' 
expectation of future market revenues.  Even if an explicit sharing mechanism is incorporated 
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into the RFP, the bidder would still reduce its bid price to the extent of the ESR's total 
anticipated revenues multiplied by its revenue share.  The point is clear: in either case, the risk 
that market revenue is not ultimately realized is shifted from customers to bidders.  
Second, competitive bids also avoid the need for regulators to administratively determine 
appropriate cost recovery for transmission assets, and how future market revenues need to be 
accounted for in determining the total revenue for the ESR.  While regulators might be adept at 
determining an appropriate cost-of-service rate, they would be placed at a severe disadvantage 
compared to the storage owner in forecasting market revenues, which depend both on ESR 
functionality and bidding strategy, factors that are especially susceptible to information 
asymmetries.  The danger, of course, is the provision of significant rents to the storage owner, far 
above the just and reasonable rate.158  
VI. PATH FORWARD FOR MULTIPLE USE ESRs: 
DETERMINING TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION 
VALUE THROUGH COMPETITION  
 
a. Competitive Procurement Under FERC Order No. 1000 
 
While states have indicated a preference for competitive procurement of multi-use ESRs 
at the distribution level, multi-use ESRs at the transmission level appear to be trending towards a 
more traditional cost-of-service model.  However, FERC’s rules provide an under-utilized path 
towards competitive procurement of multi-use ESRs, which would drive more efficient and 
economic outcomes and mitigate FERC’s concerns related to double recovery and market price 
suppression. 
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Through Orders 890 and 1000, FERC brought competition and independent transmission 
development into transmission planning.159  These Orders, in particular Order No. 1000, required 
public utility transmission provider participate in a regional transmission planning process that 
eliminated the Federal right of first refusal for certain new transmission facilities, which allowed 
incumbent utilities to have the first right to build new transmission lines.160  FERC explicitly 
allowed public utility transmission providers to use competitive solicitations,161 but rejected 
“suggestions to mandate a competitive bidding process for selecting project developers.”162 
Since Order No. 1000, competitive transmission projects have made up a small, but 
demonstrably cost-effective, proportion of the total transmission projects.  According to a 2019 
Brattle Group study, of the $75.9 billion of total transmission investments over the prior five 
years, only three percent were dedicated to 31 competitively-bid transmission projects.163  
However, for these competitively-bid transmission projects, winning bids average 40 percent 
below initial cost estimates, while non-competitive projects were completed at 34 percent above 
initial estimates.164  Although winning bids and final project costs are not a perfect comparison, 
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the competitively-bid transmission projects generally include cost caps or cost controls, reducing 
the risk and magnitude of cost escalations.165 
A multi-use ESR that is part of a successful competitive transmission project package 
should be able to retain any additional market revenue without a corresponding reduction in its 
cost-of-service.  Allowing the ESR owner to determine its revenue requirement through the bid 
provides the owner with the flexibility to estimate a reasonable market revenue expectation, 
while insulating customers from market risk.  If the ESR bid is successful against competing 
transmission projects, customers again benefit by receiving a transmission solution at a reduced 
cost due to the supplemental market revenues.  Market administrators will benefit by avoiding 
the additional administrative burdens needed to determine a partial cost recovery and revenue 
sharing mechanism for the multi-use ESR.  Further, the ESR owner will also benefit by avoiding 
these administrative burdens and will additionally be able to stack uncertain market revenue on 
top of stable and predictable transmission revenue. 
Establishing the costs attributable to the transmission services provided by ESRs through 
a competitive approach will address the concerns and goals espoused by FERC in its Policy 
Statement.166  First, allowing the ESR owner to retain market revenues will provide appropriate 
                                                 
165  Brattle Study at 30.  None of the competitively-bid projects identified during the five-year period have been 
completed.  However, the one competitive project that has been completed, the Path 15 Upgrade project, was 
completed on time and at a cost 18 percent less than the estimate by the incumbent transmission owner.  Id. at 
44. 
166  In its Policy Statement, FERC recognized that market participation for resources that receive cost recovery 
through cost-of-service rates has already been permitted in several cases.  FERC Policy Statement at P 22.  For 
instance, generation resources that participate in energy markets may also receive cost-based recovery for 
reactive power services.  Id.  Further, vertically-integrated utilities that own generation resources for which the 
utility receives cost-based rate recovery may enter the generation resources into market.  Id.  In these instances, 
revenues are fully or partially credited back to customers based on the principle that these customers have paid 
for the resource and, therefore, should receive the benefit of any resulting revenues.  See Sw. Pub. Serv. Co., 49 
FERC ¶ 61,296, at 62,133 (1989) (“Firm customers are allocated in their rates the full costs of the utility’s 
generating and transmission system. It is only appropriate then that these same firm customers receive a 100% 
credit when non-firm customers pay the utility to use the same system.”).  FERC has also allowed partial 
recovery of market revenue when a utility acknowledged that, without this revenue, the utility would lack 
37 
 
motivation to ensure “that the full capabilities of [the ESR is] realized, thereby maximizing [its] 
efficiency and value for the system and to consumers.”167   
This approach will also avoid double recovery because the ESR bid will account for 
potential market revenues.  A successful bid demonstrates that these costs attributable to the 
transmission services provided by the ESR are just and reasonable, as it will be in consistent with 
or below the costs of other transmission options.  As stated by CAISO: “Since the market 
revenues are separate from the [transmission revenue requirement] determination and received 
for providing a separate service, they do not constitute double recovery cost so long as the 
resource owner bears any additional maintenance costs incurred from voluntary market 
participation.”168   
The competitive approach also mitigates concerns that the ESRs' participation in the 
market will inappropriately suppress market prices.  FERC is generally concerned about 
resources that receive out-of-market payments bidding into the markets at lower than competitive 
prices.169  However, ESRs under the model proposed in this paper do not receive a subsidy of the 
                                                 
incentive to make market sales for the benefit of customers. Constellation Mystic Power, LLC, 165 FERC ¶ 
61,267, PP 113, 133 (2018).  In contrast to FERC’s precedent regarding market participation of generation, the 
costs of which have been fully assigned to customers, the recoverable transmission costs for competitively 
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resources may both receive cost-of-service rates and participate in FERC-jurisdictional markets, it should not 
preclude ESRs providing competitively-procured transmission services from also retaining market revenue. 
167  FERC Policy Statement at P 2.  Although simple, CAISO’s proposal for the ESR owner to receive the full costs 
of the ESR through a transmission revenue requirement and credit any market revenue to transmission 
ratepayers lacks an incentive for the owner to offer the ESR services into the market, and thus maximize the full 
capabilities of the ESR.   
168  CAISO Straw Proposal at 18. 
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61,029, at PP 170-71 (2011)) (finding that state support for specific resources, i.e., carbon-free electricity 
generation, inappropriately suppressed the prices in the PJM Interconnection capacity market); see also Robbie 
Orvis & Mike O’Boyle, It’s Time to Refine How We Talk About Wholesale Markets, Greentech Media (Feb. 12, 




kind that has typically troubled FERC.  Rather, the ESRs will receive a competitively-established 
payment, reduced to account for market revenues, for a service that is distinct from those that are 
provided in the market.  This delineation of services would be reinforced by a competitive 
solicitation that sets the parameters of control by the RTO/ISO for the provision of transmission 
services, while vesting control of the market services with the ESR owner.   
As noted by NextEra in comments to FERC, unlike subsidies for renewable or nuclear 
electricity generation, which are explicitly limited to certain resources, all resources, including 
other market participants, may submit an offer in response to a competitive transmission need.170   
Further, resources that receive cost-based recovery, including generation owned by vertically 
integrated utilities, are already participating in RTO/ISO markets.171  
b. Competitive Procurement in CAISO’s Transmission Planning 
 
CAISO provides an illuminating example of how competitive procurement fits into 
transmission planning and how multi-use ESRs may be considered in this process.  CAISO’s 
transmission planning follows three phases – Phase 1 results in a plan to study transmission 
needs, Phase 2 identifies those needs results in a comprehensive transmission plan, including 
possible non-transmission alternatives, and a competitive procurement is held in Phase 3 for 
transmission needs that qualify for the competitive process.172  Qualifying transmission needs 
include those intended to provide reliability, policy, or economic transmission solutions, except 
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Through Transmission Rates, for Grid Support Services Compensated in Other Ways, and for Multiple Services, 
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for upgrades to existing facilities.173  According to CAISO, the competitive procurement 
“considers two things (1) does the project address the identified need, and (2) what is the cost of 
the project compared to other alternatives.”174  In its Second Straw Proposal, CAISO includes 
competitive procurement in option two of its proposal, which would provide partial cost-of-
service to the multi-use ESR and allow the owner to retain the market revenues.175  However, 
CAISO considered eliminating this option because uncertain market revenues may impede 
financing.176 
It is possible that, initially, the risk inherent in forecasting uncertain market revenues may 
negate the any cost-of-service benefit, but this would represent an appropriate allocation of risk 
that will be addressed in the competitive bidding process.  If the bidder is unable to rely on any 
market revenues, the bid will have to compete without any reduction.  If the bid still proves to be 
the most economic option, the ratepayer is not harmed if those market revenues ultimately 
materialize.  Over time, as market revenues for ESRs become reliable, the financial risks will 
diminish and the bid prices will be reduced in the face of competition, to the benefit of 
consumers.  If anything, this demonstrates the elegance of competitive procurement, in which the 
onus of predicting future market revenue, and the risk those revenues don’t materialize, falls on 
the ESR owner, and the competitive process ensures that only an economic solution is selected 
even if those predicted market revenues are negligible. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
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As declared by FERC, rules for multi-use ESRs should strive to maximize the full 
capabilities of these resources, while protecting consumers from paying for excessive costs.  
Striking this balance raises several issues that have been recognized across jurisdictions, 
including prioritizing grid services, preventing double recovery, mitigating market price 
suppression, and incentivizing operators to maximize the full capabilities of the ESR.  Although 
regulatory consideration of multi-use ESRs is at its nascency, some principles are already 
receiving universal recognition, such as prioritizing grid services, and states appear to trending 
towards competitive procurement of multi-use ESRs as an efficient means to establish a cost for 
transmission and distributions services, evaluate future market revenues, provide appropriate 
incentives, and avoid double recovery and price suppression.  A route to adopt this approach 
exists at the federal level as well under FERC’s Order No. 1000, and RTOs/ISOs should consider 
the benefits of competitive procurement when developing their rules for multi-use ESRs. 
However, to make the competitive approach effective for ESRs and the grid in general, 
several additional steps should be taken.  First, competitive procurement of transmission 
solutions must be expanded.  For example, according to the Brattle Study, the limited number of 
competitive transmission procurements is due, in part, to overly restrictive rules placed on 
competition by RTOs/ISOs in regional planning.  In addition, FERC’s Order No. 1000 exempts 
from competition certain transmission projects, such as upgrades to existing transmission 
facilities.177  Some RTOs/ISOs have compounded the issue presented by this exemption by 
applying it broadly.178  Unfortunately, ESRs may be most suited to address transmission 
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upgrades, compared to other transmission projects.179  In order to realize the full benefits of 
competitive transmission procurement, and ESRs participation in those procurements, the 
RTOs/ISOs should eliminate needless restrictions and FERC should expand competition to 
include transmission upgrades. 
 
                                                 
179  See Utilization in the Organized Markets of Electric Storage Resources as Transmission Assets Compensated 
Through Transmission Rates, for Grid Support Services Compensated in Other Ways, and for Multiple Services, 
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